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Abstract:  
Jablonka & Lamb’s book is refreshing in that it debunks the exclusively gene-
centered approach used these days to explain almost anything about life and 
human behavior. The book is very accessible and most convincing when the 
authors discuss biological theories of genetic and epigenetic inheritance, but it 
does not shy away from the more slippery terrain of behavioral and symbolic 
inheritance, and specifically the origins of language. But is the analogy 
appropriate?  
 
The gene-centered view on language evolution simply equates genetic 
evolution with linguistic evolution. It argues that humans genetically inherit a 
language organ that determines to a large extent the structure of their language 
and conceptual system, and that this instinctive organ has emerged and been 
shaped through genetic evolution by natural selection, just like the liver. This 
strong nativist position is now widely disputed, both on linguistic grounds (the 
innate universal grammar has remained elusive even after almost 50 years of 
research) and on biological grounds (it is unlikely that the genome determines 
at such a fine-grained level the information processing of the brain). In Evolution 
in Four Dimensions, Jablonka & Lamb (J&L, 2005) survey these 
counterarguments and then put forward an alternative, more indirect interaction 
between genetic evolution and language evolution. They argue that the 
language system is built from neural mechanisms that are generically applicable 
to a wide range of cognitive functions and that the conventions of a specific 
language are acquired by general-purpose, socially mediated observational 
learning mechanisms, possibly with a slight bias established through genetic 
assimilation. In this scenario, the linguistic system gets copied with variation 
from adult individuals to the next generation, similar to the way the genome gets 
copied, but now by cultural instead of genetic means, thus starting a process of 
cultural evolution (Boyd & Richerson 1985). What was coded as genes 
according to the language instinct hypothesis becomes a collection of memes 
transmitted through imitation (Dawkins 1975). Although I am generally in favor 
of the cultural hypothesis, I believe there is a major problem with this cultural 
transmission scenario because of the notion of information that it implies. 
Information is never simply there, independent of the processes that use that 
information. We always need to consider the physical structure, which is 
potentially informative, and the interpreter, who brings out the information and 
uses it in a specific context. For example, the information in a computer 
program (which is, after all, just a sequence of switch settings in a computer’s 
memory) only becomes information when it is interpreted by a specific compiler 
and an operating system, using the primitive machine instructions that the 
computer can perform. The exact behavior of a running program depends in 
addition on the specific inputs and prior information states present at the time of 
program execution. If none of this is right, the program is totally useless and 
does not run at all. Similarly, the DNA macromolecule only becomes information 
when there is the interpretive machinery that can act upon it.  
Otherwise, it is a totally dead piece of matter. Just like a computer program, the 
interpreting process integrates the environment. So in that sense, the genetic 
system is not just the replicating DNA; it necessarily requires and includes the 
epigenetic system. Likewise, aspects of a situation in the world or of the 
behavior of another individual only become informative after an enormously 
complex process of perception and context-sensitive interpretation has been 
able to make sense of what is going on. A collection of speech sounds only 
becomes a carrier of information if there is somebody that can parse and 
interpret it in a specific context. The cultural transmission scenario assumes that 
enough information is present in the perception of behaviors or in language 
sentences so that the system needed to interpret and reuse them can be copied 
by imitation from one individual to another. Here lies the difficulty. The 
imitator/learner must have a sense of what aspects of reality are relevant and 
what the underlying intentions are before he or she can imitate. The real world 
is infinitely complex. Without an interpretive capacity in place, the imitator 
cannot know what exactly needs to be retained in his or her own behavior and 
when it is appropriate. For example, the tones of a vowel are very relevant in 
Chinese but are irrelevant in English, so an English speaker trying to imitate 
Chinese will not properly pay attention to the tonal distinctions, let alone be 
capable to replicate them. This is the fundamental paradox for all models of 
behavioral or symbolic inheritance that rely on imitation or observational 
learning – to imitate, you must know what counts as information and what is the 
intention of the producer. So the behavioral or cultural transfer of the 
interpretive capacity must already have taken place before the imitative act. 
This is in contrast to the copying mechanism underlying genetic inheritance, 
which does not need to know anything about what it is copying. This paradox 
explains why attempts to operationalize imitation in artificial systems have 
failed, despite a lot of effort (Dautenhahn & Nehaniv 2002). Models of cultural 
evolution based on imitation appear to assume what they try to explain. So what 
is the alternative? Perhaps it is not such a good idea to make the analogy 
between different forms of inheritance so strong. Szathmáry (2006) draws our 
attention to a distinction between replicators and reproducers that may be 
helpful here: Replicators multiply with heredity plus variation, so that selection 
can act on the population of variants. However, replicators cannot replicate on 
their own. To copy them, a reproducer is needed – an entity that can do the 
replication. Genes are replicators but not reproducers; the cell is the reproducer. 
But because the cell can perform replication of genes, which can then 
reproduce another cell given the right additional (epigenetic) context, they can 
also be regarded as replicators. Viruses, in contrast, are replicators but not 
reproducers themselves, because they need another living cell to reproduce. 
This indicates the following analogies and differences between genetic 
inheritance and symbolic or behavioral inheritance (Steels 2004): Utterances or 
features of utterances can be viewed as replicators (as in Croft 2000). Every 
time the same sort of utterance (or feature of an utterance) is produced, it is a 
replication, unavoidably, with some variation. The reproducer is the speaker’s 
total language system, which might have had to be expanded to achieve the 
speaker’s communicative goals for that utterance. When the utterance is 
interpreted by the hearer, he or she will have to exercise his or her own total 
language system, possibly expanding or adjusting it as well.  
Within this scenario, language systems are not transferred by imitation or 
observational learning but are actively constructed by speakers and hearers 
and are aligned to maximize success in communication. With enough 
interactions, the language system of a speaker will seem to have been 
transmitted to the hearer; but in fact, the transmission does not at all take place 
by copying, the way it does for DNA. 
